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Fair Trade Commission vs. MITI: History of the
Conflicts Between the Antimonopoly Policy and the

Industrial Policy in the Post War Period of Japan
by Seichi Yoshikawa*
I.

INTRODUCTION

S ince

Japanese business activities have expanded on the international level, the Japanese government's behavior and economic policy
have attracted increased attention from foreign businessmen, government
officials and economists. One particular point of interest to foreign observers seems to be the apparent fact that in Japan various mechanisms
exist to restrict the competition among enterprises. Certain terminologies,
such as "Japan, Inc.," have been invented to refer to the seemingly
unique business environment of Japan. Against such theory some economists argue that the Japanese market is highly competitive, even more so
than that of the United States or of the economy of England, where important industries are nationalized.' It is nearly an undeniable fact, however, that the Japanese antimonopoly (or antitrust) policy has been considerably circumscribed by what is called the "industrial policy" of the
Japanese government, administered most notably by its Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI).
Japanese antimonopoly policy is enforced by the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission (FTC) based on the Law Relating to the Prohibition
of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade (Antimonopoly Law). 2 When the Antimonopoly Law was promulgated shortly after
World War II, it was termed the "Economic Constitution," which meant
that all the economic policy and business activities were to be conducted
in accordance with the mandate of free competition that it embodied.
The Antimonopoly Law prohibits "private monopolies," "unreasonable
*Partner;

Koga, Yoshikawa, Yamakawa & Nakagawa of Tokyo Japan.

Tsujimura, Sango seisaku no honshitsu to dockkin seisaku (Essence of the Industrial
Policy and the Antimonopoly Policy), ECON011STO, 10-11 (Jan. 25, 1983).
2 Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kWsei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru h-ritsu (Law
Relating to the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade),
Law No. 54 of 1947 (as amended), translated in 2 EmuN-HoREm SHA LAW BULLETIN SERIES
KA [hereinafter cited as Antimonopoly Law].
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restraint of trade," s and "unfair business practices."' The FTC is
equipped with broad powers, comparable to those given to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, to enforce the Law. Yet, the restrictions on business activity imposed by the Antimonopoly Law have not been consistent
with the industrial policy administered by MITI. On many occasions
"battles" or "adjustments" between the FTC and MITI occurred over
conflicts between the respective policies, and it is fair to state that MITI
has had the better of the situation most of the time. However, by reviewing the relaxation of restrictions on cartels that occurred during the postwar period and the present status of the restrictions on cartels, certain
new trends in Japanese antimonopoly policy become manifest.
II.
A.

RELAXATION OF RESTRICTIONS ON CARTELS

Stipulated in Original Antimonopoly Law

The Antimonopoly Law was promulgated in 1947 as one important
part of the policy of the Allied Forces for the democratization of the Japanese economic environment. This original legislation reflected the idealism of the New Dealer economists of the Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) and contained much stricter antimonopoly regulations than
its American counterpart. In particular, Article 4 of the Antimonopoly
Law flatly prohibited, with minor exceptions, entrepreneurs from conducting any concerted activities (cartels) for deciding, maintaining or increasing prices, restricting production or sales volume, restricting technology, products, distribition channels or customers or limiting the new
installment or expansion of production facilities or the employment of
new production methods.5 Likewise, Article 8 provided that if the FTC
found an "undue imbalance of business capabilities," it could order the
entrepreneurs concerned to take necessary measures, such as the transfer
of business facilities, to eliminate the imbalance. Further, Chapter 4 of
the Antimonopoly Law imposed sweeping restrictions on all sorts of business combinations.7

Such drastic antimonopoly legislation was greeted by the Japanese
industrial leaders with much resentment. The Antimonopoly Law was enforced by the FTC, and observed by the industries, only under the force
of SCAP.
With termination of the Occupation in 1952, the antagonism to the
Antimonomopy Law and the FTC became open, and under such opposi3

Id. at art. 3.

Id. at
'Id. at
' Id. at
7 Id. at

art. 19.
art. 4.
art. 8.
ch. 4.
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tion both the statutes and the enforcement of antimonopoly legislation
were diluted. In particular, cartels came to be widely legalized or tolerated de facto. This was achieved by amendment to the Antimonopoly
Law itself, by creation of "bypass statutes" and by gyusei shidu (administrative guidance).
B. The 1953 Amendment to the Antimonopoly Law
In 1953, one year after termination of the Occupation, the Antimonopoly Law underwent a fundamental change.8 The change included the repeal of the anti-cartel provisions in Article 4 and the creation of provisions specifically permitting cartels under certain circumstances,9 the
repeal of Article 8 concerning elimination of the "undue imbalance of
business capabilities" and a substantial relaxation of the restrictions on
merger, shareholding and interlocking directorates. 10 The change was considered so drastic that a leading scholar of Japanese business law termed
this amendment a "qualitative change" in the antimonopoly policy. 1
It should be noted that even after repeal of Article 4, cartels are still,
in principle, illegal under Article 3 of the Antimonopoly Law's prohibition
of the "undue restraint of trade."'" However, newly created Articles 24-3
and 24-4 exempt from the application of the Antimonopoly Law "concerted activity against depression"I s (usually called "depression cartel")
and "concerted activity for enterprise rationalization"' 14 (usually called
"rationalization cartel"). The "depression cartel" is a concerted activity
of producers of a specific product (or their trade asociation) which will
be implemented if the price of the product becomes lower than the average cost of its production, the continuation of the major part of the producers' business will be difficult and if the circumstances make it difficult
for them to overcome the situation by their efforts to rationalize their
business. 5 The "rationalization cartel" is concerted activity by the producers of a specific product (or their trade association) for the purpose of
limiting technology or specific items of the product, or moves with respect
to utilization of facilities for raw materials of the product, or for delivery
thereof or utilization or purchase of by-products, refuse or waste, under
circumstances where such concerted activity is especially necessary for ef8 Law for Partial Amendment to the Law Relating to the Private Monopoly and Meth-

ods of Preserving Fair Trade, Law No. 259 of 1953.
9 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, at arts. 24-3, 24-4.

10Id. at arts. 9-18.
11S. ThuimuRA, DOKUSEN KINSHI-HO (THE ANTIMONOPOLY LAw) 17 (1961).

22

Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, at art. 3.

" Id. at art. 24-3.
at art. 24-4.
15 Id. at art. 24-3.
14 Id.

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.

Vol. 15:489

fecting technical promotion, quality improvement, cost reduction, increases in efficiency and other enterprise rationalization activities.'"
Under such circumstances, the producers (or their trade association) may
engage in the respective concerted activities after obtaining approval
from the FTC.
C. Enactment of "Bypass Statutes"
In addition to the above exempting provisions of the Antimonopoly
Law itself, special laws, "bypass statutes," have been enacted one after
another to exempt application of the Antimonopoly Law to cartels
formed under certain specific circumstances. At present, there are
twenty-eight such bypass statutes. 17 They cover cartels of entrepreneurs
belonging to certain industries which are subject to special governmental
regulations (e.g., air transportation and insurance), cartels of small or medium sized enterprises, cartels formed to avoid excessive competition in
the field of export and import transactions, cartels formed in the case of
severe depression to avoid irreparable damage to the industry concerned
and cartels formed for the purpose of enterprise rationalization.",
These bypass statutes have been enacted under the strong leadership
of MITI, which often regarded the Antimonopoly Law as an "obstacle" to
the effective administration of its industrial policy. MITI and other proponents of cartels considered such special legislation necessary even after "depression cartels" and "rationalization cartels" were legalized under
the Antimonopoly Law, since these cartels are still subject to case-by-case
FTC approval. Furthermore, MITI feared that if the FTC stringently interpreted the requirements for the implementation of cartels, the formaId. at art. 24-4.
17

K'osEI TORIHIKI IINKAI (FTC), 1982 KMsE TORIHIKI INKAi NENJI HOKOKU (ANNUAL RE-

FAIR TRADE COMMISSION) 308-309. In fact, there is still another exempting statute. The original Antimonopoly Law contained, and still contains, Article 22 which provides
that the law will not apply to a legitimate act of an entrepreneur or a trade association
conducted under the authority of certain statutes designated by a special statute. In order
to enforce this mandate, a designating statute called the Law Concerning Exemption, etc. of
Application of the Law Relating to Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade, Law No. 138 of 1947 was promulgated. Law No. 138 exempts from application of the Antimonopoly Law cartels under five statutes, including the Local Railway
Law, Law No. 52 of 1919 (as amended) and the Land Transportation Business Adjustment
Law, Law No. 71 of 1938 (as amended).
s KlOSM TORIHIKI IINKAI, supra note 17, at 174-75.
19 Many businessmen favor cartels. For example, Mr. Yoshihiro Inayama, Chairman of
Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations), the most influential organization of
the Japanese business, is an outspoken proponent of cartels and, for that reason, he is called
"Mr. Cartel." See also Inayama, Watashi no jiron (My Cherished Opinion) in KOKUSAI
PORT OF THE

KYOSORYOKU To DOKKIN-HO (ABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION AND THE ANTIMONOPOLY
LAW) (1963).
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tion of cartels would not be permitted as a practical matter. This fear is
the reason why some bypass statutes specifically deal with the circumstances in which depression and rationalization cartels are allowed. For
example, under the Specified Industry Structural Improvement Temporary Measures Law,20 one of the most important bypass statutes, MITI is
authorized to instruct entrepreneurs in specified industries (aluminum,
chemical textiles, chemical fertilizer, paper and petro-chemical industries)
to conduct concerted activity with respect to disposition and construction
of production equipment.2 1 The resultant concerted activity is exempted
from the Antimonopoly Law.22
Under most of these statutes, entrepreneurs do not have to deal with
the FTC; they are to obtain an approval from, or file a report to, the
competent minister in charge of the particular industrial sector concerned.23 In many of such occasions the competent ministers have only to
"consult" or "notify" the FTC in granting the approval or accepting the
report. Consequently, apart from the cartels formed under administrative
guidance, more cartels have been formed based on the bypass statutes
than on the exempting provisions of the Antimonopoly Law. For example,
after the Specific Depressed Industry Stability Temporary Measures Law
came into force in 1978, twenty-five depression cartels have been formed
under this law compared to only eight cartels formed under Art. 24-3 of
the Antimonopoly Law. 4 In the period from 1953 to March 1982, the total number of cartels formed under the bypass statutes is 19,762 compared to 265 formed under the Antimonopoly Law. 5
D.

Cartels Formed under Administrative Guidance

Even more important than the bypass statutes in the formation of
cartels is the frequent intervention of gyzysei shid i (administrative guidance) which is conducted by various ministries, particularly MITI. It is
already well known abroad that administrative guidance permeates every
aspect of Japanese administration.28 This technique has also been widely
20

Specified Depressed Industry Stability Temporary Measures Law, Law No. 44 of

1978, as amended and renamed by amending statute of May 24, 1983, Law No. 53 of 1983.
See infra note 77 and accompanying text.

Id. at art. 5.
Id. at art. 11.
23 Export Import Transaction Law, Law No. 299 of 1952 (as amended), arts. 5, 5-2, 5-3,
7-2 and 7-3; Specified Equipment Information Industry Promotion Temporary Measures
Law, Law No. 84 of 1978, arts. 6 and 10.
24 KUSi TORIHIKI IINKAI, supra note 17, at 310-15.
21

22

00

Id.

The concept of administrative guidance is discussed in Sanekata, Administrative
Guidance and the Antimonopoly Law, 10 LAw IN JAPAN 65 (1977). Literature on administrative guidance is abundant. See Matsushita & Repeta, Restricting the Supply of Japanese
6
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used in the formation of cartels.
A typical example of this practice is kankoku sotan (literally translated, recommended curtailment of operation) which was started in 1952,
a year before the 1953 Amendment of the Antimonopoly Law, and has
since been frequently repeated. In 1952, the price of cotton yarn started
to decline and MITI issued a "recommendation" to all major spinning
mills that the total monthly production be limited to 150,000 bales. Each
mill received a suggested volume of maximum production. Since such
"recommendation" was not based on any specific statutory authorization,
it was possible, as a matter of law, for the mills not to follow the guidance. However, in conjunction with the issuance of the recommendation,
MITI declared that if any mill did not follow the guidance it would reduce the import quota of raw cotton to be allocated to that mill. Thus, all
the mills curtailed their operations in compliance with the recommenda7
tion, and the price of cotton yarn became stabilized soon thereafter.1
Other examples of cartels based on administrative guidance include
the purchase and stockpiling by the Cotton Products Export Association
of cotton cloth produced by major mills, the freeze of inventory of textile
products and the "open sale" system under which MITI supervised sale
2
of steel by major manufacturers.

As already noted, administrative guidance is conducted in most cases
without any specific statutory authorization, but the guidance is justified
on the basis of the general authority conferred upon the particular ministry, such as MITI, by the law establishing it. 29 As a matter of law, entre-

preneurs may refuse to comply with guidance; however, actually they do
follow the guidance for a variety of reasons. An important reason is that
guidance directed towards formation of cartels is, in most cases, exactly
what entrepreneurs want. Another reason is that, although guidance may
not be legally enforced, non-compliance is frequently thought to trigger
unfavorable action by the ministry in the future. A classic example of this
is provided by the refusal of Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. to follow
MITI's guidance for kankoku sotan in 1975. This refusal provoked MITI
to declare that it would reduce the import quota for coal to be allocated
to Sumitomo. This action eventually forced Sumitomo to yield.3 0
Automobiles: Sovereign Compulsion or Sovereign Collusion?, 14 CAsE W. RES. J.

INT'L

L.

47, 69 n.97 (1982).
27 K-SEi TORIHII

IINKAI, DOKUSEN KINsHI SEISAKU

TORY OF ANTIMONOPOLY POLICIES)

96-97 (1977).

30

NEN-SHI

(A

THmTY-YFAR His-

Id. at 97-99.
19 Hearing before the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives (Mar. 12,
1974) (testimony of the Director-General of the Legislative Bureau of the Cabinet) 741
JumsuTo 38 (1981).
30 Kawasaki, Gy'6sei shid'5 no jittal (Actual Conditions of Administrative Guidance),
342 JuRIsuTo 51 (1966).
28
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It is generally considered that administrative guidance without specific statutory authorization is legal,31 although to force the party to
whom the guidance is directed to comply by resorting to a threat of sanction is sometimes considered illegal. 2 MITI's action in the Sumitomo
Metal case was criticized on this basis.3 3 Apart from the legality of administrative guidance in general, the question of the legality of administrative
guidance in light of the Antimonopoly Law has always been a point of
3
heated discussion, especially between the FTC and MITI. 1
III.

FACTORS CAUSING "WEAKNESS"

IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE

ANTIMONOPOLY POLICY

Since the Antimonopoly Law's introduction in Japan, antimonopoly
policy has been weakened considerably. The FTC's thirty year history,
from its inception to 1974, was termed by some journalists as a "history
of humiliation. '35 Several factors caused this description of the FTC's
performance.
Firstly, it is often pointed out that Japanese people have the peculiar
mentality of preferring cooperation or harmony to competition. Thus, to
do something together with others (even with one's competitor) is a virtuous deed and is hardly considered a crime. This stereotype may be true;
yet, it is not quite clear whether the Japanese mentality is really relevant
to the proliferation of cartels in Japan, because, as some writers point
out,36 Japanese entrepreneurs do compete vigorously.
Secondly, cartels are deeply rooted in the history of Japanese industrial development from the time of the Meiji Restoration in 1868. One
remarkable characteristic of Japanese capitalism lies in the fact that the
government has played a leading role in its development. Governmental
agencies, notably the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in the prewar
days and MITI at present, have planned overall industrial policy, and
supervised the business activities of entrepreneurs to a great extent
through the power to license and grant subsidies. In so doing, the agencies have various divisions which correspond to industrial sectors, and
each division is in charge of a specific industrial sector (tatewarigyosei).
Industry-wide trade associations have been created to function as a conYamanouchi, Gy'Ssei shiddo to h'ochi shugi (Administrative Guidance and the Rule of
Law), 566 JuRISro 14 (1974).
32 Suzuki, Gyo6sei shido-o meguru hanrei no dok'5 (Trend of Court Decisions Concerning Administrative Guidance), 741 JuisuTro 46 (1981).
'3 Atsuya, Dokusen Kinshiho to gy'sei shid'- (The Antimonopoly Law and Administrative Guidance), 741 JuRisuTro 55 (1981).
, This dispute was a key issue in the oil cartel case, discussed infra.
31

MAINICHI SHIhMBUN KEIZAI-BU, K-TORI-I WA MOETA (THE FTC BURNED)

8 Tsujimura, supra note 1, at 11.

134 (1975).
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duit between their rembers and the relevant divisions of the ministry.
Such a mechanism for conducting business activity creates a situation in
which entrepreneurs are constrained to take a nearly uniform action
within the industrial field to which they belong in compliance with the
policy and guidance of the government. Under such circumstances, the
government has sponsored creation of cartels to keep industry in order,
especially in times of recession.
Thirdly, Japanese business has a special nature which renders it
much more in need of cartels than business in western countries. Generally, labor mobility in Japan is quite low; white collar and blue collar
workers alike stay with one employer throughout their career. The bankruptcy of an employer and the resultant unemployment, therefore, tend
to create much more severe consequences for the workers than in countries with higher labor mobility. Accordingly, prevention of a bankruptcy
is always an utmost concern of the nation. Further, Japanese business
lacks flexibility in adjusting the volume of production according to market conditions for a variety of reasons. Japanese firms borrow heavily and
their fixed costs are quite high. The Japanese employment system is such
that laying off workers is difficult. The maintenance of market shares is of
utmost importance to Japanese businesses. Thus, even during a recession,
Japanese companies try extremely hard to maintain levels of production
(even at the expense of profit) and competing companies tend to get
stuck in endless cut-throat competition. It is only by a mutual agreement
(cartel), made frequently at the initiative of a governmental agency, that
37
Japanese companies are able to put an end to such competition.
Fourthly, the "weakness" of the FTC vis-A-vis MITI and other ministries administering economic policy results partly from a lack of political
support. Whenever major disputes have occurred between the FTC and
MITI over the enforcement of antimonopoly policy, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) s has supported MITI. For example, when the FTC
persistently refused to approve the merger plan of Yawata Steel and Fuji
Steel in 1968, the LDP attacked the FTC. It even threatened to "reorganize" the Commission. 9 Unlike iost of the other administrative agencies,
the FTC, taking as a model the independent administrative agencies in
the United States, is granted status and authority independent of the
Cabinet,40 and the Commissioners enjoy guarantees against discharge and
11 Id. at 14-15; K.
324-25 (1973).

KoMI

& Y.

SH!NONOYA, NINON KEizAI-RON (ON JAPANE S EcONOMY)

'8 The Liberal Democratic Party has been the ruling party throughout the entire post
war era, except for a short period, 1947-48.
39 MAINIcHI SHIMBUN KEiZAi-BU, supra note 35, at 184-87.
'0 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, at art. 28.
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reduction of salary.4 1 In advocating the reorganization of the FTC, influential members of the LDP declared that such provisions were unconstitutional since they violated Article 65 of the Constitution which provides
that the executive power rests with the Cabinet. 42 It was under such political pressure that the merger was eventually approved by the FTC with
certain changes in the original plan.
Lastly, some critics attribute the "weakness" of the FTC to the pre43
vailing practices of appointment of its Commissioners and personnel.
An overwhelming majority of FTC Commissioners have been appointed
from the ranks of senior officials of various government ministries. Out of
twelve chairmen appointed to date, seven have been former officials of
the Ministry of Finance (MOF).4 4 In addition, a tacit rule has been established that the five Commissioners (including the chairman) always include one MOF, one MITI and one Ministry of Justice official, with the
remaining two frequently recruited from former officials of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the Bank of Japan. 45 Though in the early days
several judges, lawyers and law professors were appointed to the FTC, no
such professional has become a Commissioner since 1952. Furthermore,
the post of Secretary General, a top official second only to the Commissioners, and a few other key positions are now "reserved" for officials
temporarily "transferred" (shukko) from the MOF.46
Accordingly, critics opine that even though the FTC is supposed to
be independent it tends to be "conciliatory" towards MITI, which nor47
mally represents the interest of business vis-h-vis the FTC.

IV. NEw TRENDS IN THE 1970's
In 1973, however, new trends began to emerge. In that year, the Japanese economy was in turmoil as a result of the oil shokku, and the price
of oil increased sharply. Increases in the price of many commodities became a fact of everyday life, and some items of daily use, such as detergent and toilet paper, disappeared from supermarkets. At the same time
of this panic, the newspapers reported that large trade firms were
Id. at arts. 31 and 36.
MAINCHI SHIMBUN KEzAI-Bu, supra note 35, at 184-87.
43 Id. at 188-201.
" For a list of all the commissioner's appointed up to 1977, see KiSEI ToRIHIKI IINAKI,
supra note 27, at 551. Since then, two former MOF officials and a former Bank of Japan
official have been appointed as chairmen.
45 MAINCHI SHIMBUN KFZAi-Bu, supra note 35, at 193.
"' Id. at 198. From 1953 to 1958, when the Antimonopoly Law was amended and bypass
statutes were enacted, an important post at the FTC was occupied by Mr. Norifumi Kumagai, who was then temporarily transferred from MITI and later became Vice Minister of
MITI. Id. at 199.
47 Id. at 202-06.
41
42
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manipulating prices by withholding inventory 48 and that oil companies
were engaging in concerted activities to raise the price of oil.49 Thus, big
business and, in particular, the trade firms and the oil companies were
severely criticized by consumer organizations and opposition parties."
Even MITI's Vice-Minister said that the oil industry was the "cause of all
evils." 51
Consequently, the FTC, under the strong leadership of Chairman
Toshihide Takahashi, took a firm stand in enforcing the Antimonopoly
Law and proposing its amendment to provide for more stringent restrictions.5 2 A typical example was the FTC's action directed towards indictment of oil companies and their trade association.
A.

Criminal Indictment of Oil Companies and their Trade Association

The FTC investigated the major oil companies and their trade association, which had formed cartels for production and price control several
times in 1973 even after the FTC issued "recommendations" to stop the
cartels. In 1974 the FTC not only issued another "recommendation" to
terminate the cartels, but it filed accusations against twelve major oil suppliers and sekiyu remmei (Japan Petroleum Association) for criminal indictment.with the Tokyo Public Prosecutor's Office.5" Although the Antimonopoly Law makes it a crime to form cartels unless it is permitted
under the exempting provisions of the Antimonopoly Law or one of the
bypass statutes, 54 during the entire period in which the Antimonopoly
Law was in force no single case of criminal sanction was ever sought by
the FTC against parties who engaged in illegal cartel activities. It appears
that the Japanese business community had little comprehension, if any,
that it was a crime to form cartels.5 5 Accordingly, the FTC's initiative was
a surprise to many.
Subsequently, the oil companies and the Japan Petroleum Association were brought to trial before the Tokyo High Court.5" It was alleged
Asahi Shimbun, Mar. 7, 1973, at 3; id., Mar. 9, 1973, at 22; id., Mar. 22, 1973, at 3.
Id., Nov. 13, 1973, at 9; id., Nov. 21, 1973, at 9.
50 Id., Apr. 5, 1973, at 1 (evening ed.); id., Apr. 11, 1973, at 1 (evening ed.); id., Apr. 14,
1973, at 22; id., Jan. 29, 1974, at 9 (evening ed.).
51 Id., Dec. 4, 1973, at 7.
0' MAINCHI SHIMBUN KEIZAI-BU, supra note 35, at 10-17, 30-40.
'8

11Id.

at 11.

54 Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, at art. 89.
55 When the FTC filed the accusation against the oil companies, Mr. Toshihide
Takahashi, chairman of the FTC, emphasized that one objective of taking such a course of
action was to let the business circle and the public recognize that a cartel constitutes a
crime. MAINICHI SHIMBUN KEiZAI-BU, supra note 35, at 16.
" With respect to most actions, civil or criminal, brought under the Antimonopoly
Law, the Tokyo High Court has exclusive and original jurisdiction. Antimonopoly Law,
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that the twelve companies engaged in concerted activities for raising the
prices of various oil products and that the Association allocated to fourteen oil refineries the amount of oil that each refinery was to process into
final products. The Court rendered judgment on September 26, 1980.11
The Court acquitted the Association but held that the twelve oil companies and their executives were guilty of price fixing. The Court sentenced
the executives to from four to ten months imprisonment (although the
sentences were suspended) and imposed fines ranging from'1,500,000 to
2,500,000 yen." The defendants who were found guilty appealed to the
Supreme Court where the case is still pending.
The oil cartel case presented an interesting legal issue of how the
involvement of administrative guidance affects the legality of a cartel.
The defendants strongly argued that they acted in compliance with
MITI's administrative guidance, which was given upon its authority
under the Oil Business Law,5" and that their acts, if otherwise illegal,
therefore were legal. The High Court, noting the existence of potentially
conflicting policies between the Antimonopoly Law and the Oil Business
Law, held that, as a general rule, while administrative guidance directed
independently to each company was legal, guidance which invited concerted actions among the companies could not be considered permissible."' Based on this principle, the Court concluded that both the acts of
the Association and the twelve companies were illegal, 61 but, in the case
involving the Association, circumstances existed which caused the defendants to legitimately believe that its conduct was not illegal. Thus, under
such circumstances, the Association could not be held criminally
62
responsible.
B. Amendment of the Antimonopoly Law Toward More Stringent
Restrictions
In 1973 the FTC initiated a move towards amending the Antimonopoly Law to eliminate what it considered evils caused by insufficient restrictions on oligopolistic enterprises and the formation of cartels. For example, under then existing Antimonopoly Law provisions, even though
the FTC issued an order to cease a cartel activity and it was in fact terminated, consequences already created by the cartel, such as price increases,
supra note 2, at art. 85.
17 Judgment of September 26, 1980, Tokyo High Court, 983 Hanrei jiho 22, 985 Hanrei
jiho 3.

51Id. 985 Hanrei jih- at 8.
' Law No. 128 of 1962 (as amended).
60 Judgment of September 26, 1980, 983 Hanrei jiho at 58-59.
01 Id. 983 Hanrei jiho at 60.
42 Id. 983 Hanrei jihb at 66.
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could not be eliminated. Thus, against a cartel activity which could
achieve its objective within a short period of time, no effective sanction
existed, especially when a criminal sanction is rarely invoked.
The FTC decided to tackle these problems by incorporating more effective sanctions in the Antimonopoly Law. It prepared its own draft for
the amendment, but this move naturally met strenuous objections from
MITI and business concerns. A stormy battle ensued; yet, after three
years of deliberations the amending bill finally passed the Diet on May
26, 1977,63 although the bill had been somewhat diluted from the original
FTC draft. Throughout this process, the FTC acted so enthusiastically
for its cause that a group of journalists, who published a book on the
background of the amendment, described the FTC's enthusiasm by entitling the book, The FTC Burned.4

The 1977 amendment to the Antimonopoly Law 5 includes the following major features:
1. Elimination of "Monopolistic Conditions"
Newly created Article 8-4 provides that if "monopolistic conditions"
exist, the FTC may order the entrepreneur(s) in question to "effect partial transfer of business or take other measures necessary for recovering
competition in respect of the commodity or service" concerned. 6 Article
2, paragraph 7 gives a detailed definition of the "monopolistic conditions. 1 7 Summarized, "monopolistic conditions" are defined in three
ways: (1) in the industrial sector, when the total value of a particular
commodity or other commodities having a similar function or a particular
service supplied in Japan during the last one year period exceeds fifty
billion yen, when the market share of an entrepreneur exceeds fifty percent or when the total of the market shares of two entrepreneurs exceeds
seventy-five percent; (2) when circumstances exist which render it extremely difficult for other entrepreneurs to enter the market; and (3)
when, during a considerable period of time, there has been remarkable
increase in prices, or little reduction thereof, in light of the fluctuation of
supply and demand and the costs for supplying the particular commodity
or service, and the entrepreneurs have acquired profits greatly exceeding
"average" rates of profit or expended sales and general administration
expenses extremely greater than "average" sales and general administra"' Law for Partial Amendment to the Law Relating to the Prohibition of Private Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade, Law No. 63 of 1977.
"' MAINICHI SHIMBUN KEIZAI-BU, supra note 35, at title page.
"5 Law No. 63 of 1977, supra note 63.
"8Antimonopoly Law, supra note 2, at art. 8-4.
11 Id. at art. 2, para. 7.
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tion expenses.68
2. Imposition of Surcharge on Illegal Cartels
Articles 7-2 and 8-3 were created to rectify the absence of effective
sanctions against a cartel which had already dissolved by the time the
FTC became apprised of it. Under these provisions the FTC must levy a
surcharge upon the entrepreneurs or the trade association that engaged in
unreasonable restraint of trade or concluded an international agreement
or contract constituting unreasonable restraint of trade, which pertains to
the price of a particular commodity or service, or affects the price by limiting the supply of the commodity or services in question. The amount of
the surcharge is prescribed to be one half of the sum equivalent to three
percent of the amount of sales realized by the entrepreneurs concerned
during the period that the activity continued (four percent in the case of
a manufacturing business, two percent in the case of a retail business, and
one percent in the case of a wholesale business). 9
3. Reporting Requirement in the Case of Parallel Price Increases
It frequently happens that, even when entrepreneurs in the same
business increase the price of their products at approximately the same
time, no evidence can be gathered to prove that such price increases are
the result of a cartel arrangement among the entrepreneurs concerned. To
cope with such a situation, the 1977 amendment has authorized the FTC
to obtain a report concerning such "alignmental price increases" from the
entrepreneurs concerned, under certain conditions meticulously defined:
(1) if such price increase has occurred in an industrial sector where
the total value of the commodity or service supplied during a defined
one-year period exceeds thirty billion yen; and
(2) if the total volume of the commodity or services supplied by the
three largest suppliers occupies more than seventy percent of the total
volume of the commodity or service supplied by the entire industrial sector; and
(3) if two or more of the five largest entrepreneurs in that industrial sector (including the largest) have increased
the price at the same or
70
a similar rate during a three-month period.
4. Restriction on Shareholding by Large Corporations
Still another major point of amendment was the creation of a ceiling
SId.
"Id. at arts. 7-2 and 8-3.
0 Id. at art. 18-2.
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with respect to the aggregate amount of shares that a large-sized corporation is permitted to hold in other corporations.7" This was designed to
alleviate the competition-impeding effect of a large corporation's grouping (keiretsu-ka) of enterprises, especially a trading firm, by way of acquisition of shares in other corporations. A restriction on shareholding by
financial institutions already existed, and they are not permitted to hold
shares in any domestic corporations in excess of five percent of the total
issued and outstanding shares of such corporation.7 2 However, newly established Article 9-2 applies to any stock corporation not engaged in
financial business. Article 9-2 provides that any such corporation, having
capital of ten billion yen or more or net assets of thirty billion yen or
more, shall not acquire or hold shares in any domestic corporation if the
aggregated acquisition price of all the shares in domestic corporations
held by it exceeds the amount of its paid-in capital or the amount of its
net asset, whichever is greater.7"
Indictment of the oil companies and the 1977 amendment of the Antimonopoly Law are considered to be epoch-making events in the postwar history of antimonopoly policies in Japan. These two events were the
first major move toward more stringent regulation of cartels. The occurrence of these events may be attributable to a number of factors. Undoubtedly, an important factor was the anti-big business atmosphere existing during this period. Coupled with this was the fact that at that time,
the ruling party held the majority of the Diet by only a small margin and
could not resist the demand of the opposition parties to amend the Antimonopoly Law. Still another factor was the strong leadership of Chairman Toshihide Takahashi,7 4 who created the FTC's image that it is an
agency to be feared.
V.

FUTURE TRENDS

It is true that by now the Antimonopoly Law and the FTC, the creations of SCAP, have established themselves well in the Japanese legal
and administrative system. In particular, the FTC has been quite active
in enforcing the prohibition against employment of "unfair business prac'
tices" and "undue premiums and indications."75
Also, since the Japanese
government liberalized its policy concerning capital investment and licensing of technology by foreign corporations in the early part of the
1970's, the FTC has undertaken the role of carefully screening problemat7' Id. at art. 9-2.
72 Id. at art. 11.
73 Id. at art. 9-2.
71 MAINICHI SHIMBUN KEIZAI-BU,
7 Id. at 174-175.

supra note 35, at 188-192.
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ical provisions contained in international agreements in these fields. Ironically, this is what MITI expected of the FTC."
However, even after the epoch-making events of the oil cartel indictment and the 1977 amendment to the Antimonopoly Law, the pro-cartel
climate in Japan seems to be unchanged, and the tide may turn again
toward further relaxation of the limitations upon cartels. A sign of this
shift is the fact that in May, 1983 an important bypass statute, Specified
Depressed Industry Stability Temporary Measures Law, which had been
promulgated in 1978 with limited duration of five years, was not only renewed, but also was substantially amended and renamed as Specified Industry Structural Improvement Temporary Measures Law,7 7 which is
considered by many businessmen to be extremely important in saving ailing industries. The new law is designed to grant MITI a more positive
role in the creation of cartels than the pre-amendment law, i.e., a broad
authority to prepare and effectuate "business collaboration plans" in
specified industries, such as those related to the aluminum, chemical textile, chemical fertilizer, paper and petro-chemical sectors. Under these
plans, major manufacturers belonging to the respective industries would
engage, under MITI's supervision, in the joint sale of products, the
merger or assignment of business facilities, the joint development of technology and the assignment of production to other companies.7 8 As a result
of the negotiation between MITI and the FTC, it has been decided that
the cartels formed under this statute will not be technically immune from
FTC screening under the Antimonopoly Law, and, if any problems arise
under the Antimonopoly Law in a specific case, they will be resolved by
prior consultation between MITI and the FTC.7 9 It remains to be seen
how effectively the FTC will be able to check cartel arrangements based
on the prior consultation with MITI.
Another sign of change is a move within the ruling party towards a
"backward" amendment of the Antimonopoly Law. The LDP's Antimonopoly Law Investigation Special Committee is seriously considering
7' An official of the Foreign Investment Section of the Ministry of Finance wrote in
1972: "As the regulation of foreign capital at the entrance is relaxed under the liberalization
measures, great hope is placed upon the Antimonopoly Law for regulating evils caused by
mono- or oligopoly of foreign capital." Tomizawa, Shihon jiyuka to hoteki shomondai (Capital Liberalizationand Various Legal Problems), 496 JumrsuTro 187 (1972). This opinion is
considered to represent the view of the Japanese government, most notably that of MITI.
7
Law No. 53 of 1983.
78 Id. at art. 8-2. MITI has acted quickly under the authority of the new law and has
already prepared "business structure improvement plans" covering such industries as
etylene, chemical fertilizer and aluminum, under which companies within the industries
concerned are instructed, among other things, to curtail production and undertake joint production with competitors. Nihon Keiza Shimbun, June 21, 1983, at 1, 5.
7 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Feb. 4, 1983, at 3.
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an amendment specifically designed to further relax restrictions on cartels, including the repeal of the provision concerning the imposition of a
surcharge which, as discussed supra, was inserted only as of the 1977
amendment.8 0
In a time of depression, opposition to such moves is not vocal in Japan. Some scholars and critics warn, however, that the further relaxation
of cartel restrictions would adversely affect the mounting trade conflicts
Japan is presently encountering.81 As a matter of fact, U.S. Trade Representative William Brock had expressed, before the Specified Industry
Structural Improvement Temporary Measures Law was enacted, his concern that the proposed legislation would lead to the creation of new barri82
ers to the entry of foreign entrepreneurs into the Japanese market.
These statements illustrate the emergence of a new situation where the
Japanese antimonopoly and industrial policies can no longer remain a
purely domestic question for the Japanese government.8 3
In retrospect, foreign pressure has exerted considerable influence
upon Japanese antimonopoly policy. The Antimonopoly Law itself was
created by foreigners and it underwent the first "qualitative" change
when the Occupation ended. Mergers between or among giant corporations (Yawata Steel-Fuji Steel, Ishikawajima Heavy Industry-Harima
Shipbuilding, Nissan Motor-Prince Motor, the three Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, etc.) were approved under the perceived threat of a foreign
"menace" just before trade and capital liberalization. If viewed in this
context, Japanese antimonopoly and industrial policies will have a new
impact overseas under the new circumstances of stronger Japanese corporations and will be subjected to new criticism by foreign competitors for
theii "excessive" export drive and the "closed nature" of the Japanese
market.

:o Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Jan. 28, 1983, at 2.
' Tanso, Dokkin-ho (kyoso-ho) no Kohusai-sei (International Nature of the Antimonopoly Law (Competition Law)), 781 JuRisuTo 161 (1983).
: Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Feb. 3, 1983, at 3.
3' Another ready example is provided by the fact that export cartels formed by Japanese television manufacturers, under MITI's guidance, were met with the antitrust lawsuits
instituted by American manufacturers in the United States. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981). For an interesting treatment of this
case, see Matsushita & Repeta, supra note 26, at 69-70, 74.

